The Principle of Credulity states: "...(in the absence of special considerations)...if it appears to a subject that X is present, then X is probably present. What one seems to perceive is probably so."
To which, my first question would be: What is meant by 'present'?
If one merely means, subjectively present, then the claim is vacuous. Obviously it appears to be present, unless we are accusing these people of wilful deception, which I am not inclined to do for every believer who has claimed such experiences (though I am sure there are plenty of believers who have grossly exaggerated the strength and clarity of such experiences, if not entirely made them up - perhaps out of what they see as a virtuous desire to promote the religion that they believe will save people's souls.
If one merely means, subjectively present, then the claim is vacuous. Obviously it appears to be present, unless we are accusing these people of wilful deception, which I am not inclined to do for every believer who has claimed such experiences (though I am sure there are plenty of believers who have grossly exaggerated the strength and clarity of such experiences, if not entirely made them up - perhaps out of what they see as a virtuous desire to promote the religion that they believe will save people's souls.
If one means that it is 'really' there, then immediately we risk stepping into a hugely problematic area of metaphysics (i.e. the debate between realists and anti-realists). Countless philosophers have argued that we cannot know what is truly real, or that the world is essentially made up of our perceptions. However, whilst I am interested in this debate, it is not the line or argument I think is most relevant to Swinburne's claims.
One might hope to avoid all this, and argue for a 'common sense' understanding of reality... which some modern philosophers have called 'naive realism'. However, when the matter at stake is not at all a matter of common sense - i.e. claims of religious experience, then the appeal to common sense reality is not justified. There is a convincing argument for a kind of pragmatism, which allows us to get on with life, since solipsism is highly unsatisfactory, and we don't get too far if we don't come to accept that things like trees and computers are 'real' - Hilary Putnam has proposed what he calls 'Pragmatic Realism' as a kind of 'solution' to this debate. Unless one believes that there is a good pragmatic case for believing in God because of the benefits this brings (which I think is highly dubious to say the least), then the appeal to common sense realism falls flat when we are dealing with religious experiences. People can get by perfectly well without believing in God or angels, etc, if not better.
The Principle of Testimony states: "In the absence of special considerations the experiences of others are (probably) as they report them ... In general there are no special considerations for doubting what subjects report about their religious experiences."
In response to such claims, Richard Dawkins has often quoted the astronomer and atheist Carl Sagan's famous phrase: 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence'. The point being that whilst it makes sense to accept in general what people say, for example, about what they had for breakfast, or how many children they have, it is not wise to naively accept what they say if they are claiming to have run 100 metres in less than 9 seconds, or that they can make themselves disappear for a day once a year. We would rightly demand pretty sound evidence for such claims.
Furthermore, it worth looking at these 'special considerations' that Swinburne mentions. He suggests that unless we know someone to be a habitual liar, mentally ill, or to be 'under the influence' of some hallucinogen, we should trust what they say. He goes on to argue that it would unreasonable to assume this for all the millions of people who have claimed such experiences. In other words, it seems he is hoping that the sheer weight of numbers adds an increased probability that some of these experiences are veridical. However, it still seems to me that the 'burden of proof' lies with the believers to give a good reason to accept that when people claim to see something that most people cannot see (and those that can cannot see most of the time), that this is not in itself a reason to doubt their state of mind.
Furthermore, it worth looking at these 'special considerations' that Swinburne mentions. He suggests that unless we know someone to be a habitual liar, mentally ill, or to be 'under the influence' of some hallucinogen, we should trust what they say. He goes on to argue that it would unreasonable to assume this for all the millions of people who have claimed such experiences. In other words, it seems he is hoping that the sheer weight of numbers adds an increased probability that some of these experiences are veridical. However, it still seems to me that the 'burden of proof' lies with the believers to give a good reason to accept that when people claim to see something that most people cannot see (and those that can cannot see most of the time), that this is not in itself a reason to doubt their state of mind.
For more on this topic, I recommend checking out the following site: http://www.philosophers.co.uk/cafe/rel_four.htm
The article finishes (appropriately, I think) by responding with arguments from David Hume, such as those he used against belief in miracles. I think that on the whole David Hume's arguments stand up as a convincing refutation of Swinburne's suggestion that these experiences are 'probably' true.
The article finishes (appropriately, I think) by responding with arguments from David Hume, such as those he used against belief in miracles. I think that on the whole David Hume's arguments stand up as a convincing refutation of Swinburne's suggestion that these experiences are 'probably' true.
