"A common opinion prevails that the juice has ages ago been pressed out of the free-will controversy, and that no new champion can do more than warm up stale arguments which everyone has heard. This is a radical mistake. I know of no subject less worn out, or in which inventive genius has a better chance of breaking open new ground--not, perhaps, of forcing a conclusion or of coercing assent, but of deepening our sense of what the issue between the two parties really is, of what the ideas of fate and of free will imply."
Despite my title, I should start by saying that I am of the opinion that the topic of Free Will and Determinism poses certain intractable problems for philosophy. I respect the dilemmas generated by centuries of philosophy too much to proffer any kind of simple 'solution'. In fact, it is precisely for this reason that I prefer to call myself a Soft Determinist than a compatibilist. If we allow the libertarians to define free will as the ability to have done
otherwise (cf C A Campbell), then it seems clear to me that this is not compatible with classical determinism. This point is not an unimportant claim, and as such is worth exploring with more careful analysis.
Determinism is generally equated with belief in the 'principle of universal causation': that all events have a cause. Whilst I recognize that the notion of 'causation' is in itself a whole area of philosophical analysis and argument, it would derail me too much to survey this fully at this point. (Briefly: I personally am intrigued by the work of Helen Beebee, a compatibilist who has developed a defense of a Humean theory of causal non-necessitation; and of Hilary Putnam, who has argued, in
Pragmatic Realism that statements about causation are 'radically perspectival'). Whilst I would not want to be said to have ignored such scholarship, I think that, at least at a common sense level, to say 'X causes Y' is to say that X materially implies Y. Given that X was the case, we then are led to the conclusion that Y could not have been
otherwise. In conclusion, then, belief in universal causation, is a belief that universally, things could not have been
otherwise. Hence, Free Will is not compatible with Determinism.
Let me clarify what I intend to defend: my idea of 'soft determinism' has some roots in William James' idea in
The Dilemma of Determinism, but needs to be distinguished from certain interpretations of that definition. Let us look further at his words about the term:
"Old-fashioned determinism was what we may call hard determinism. It did not shrink from such words as fatality, bondage of the will, necessitation, and the like. Nowadays, we have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and, repudiating fatality, necessity, and even predetermination, says that its real name is freedom; for freedom is only necessity understood, and bondage to the highest is identical with true freedom." (op cit.)
I do not believe in fate, with its implication of there being some force or plan or intelligence guiding our futures to a certain destination. I sort of believe in the bondage of the will, but not in the sense implied by St Paul saying that we are slaves to 'sin'. Why 'sin' is given such importance I do not know. All sorts of things are compelling, not just unchristian things, and many habits of thought that captivate us are surely of just the sort that the YHWH of the Bible would approve. Perhaps the real problem with the analogy implied by the word bondage, is that it could be interpreted as meaning that our will is something separate, which would be free if it weren't constrained by our desires and appetites. To me, the will is just a word for the brain process which initiates when different imagined outcomes are brought to consciousness. Each outcome might perhaps satisfy different desires and appetites, and forego others, thus it seems to me a better way round to suggest that our will keeps certain appetites in bondage.
I wouldn't 'repudiate' the word 'necessitation' either. I personally believe that the determinists are right in saying that choice is an illusion, on a metaphysical level. I can certainly imagine having chosen differently, but how can we ascribe reality to counterfactuals? Probably only by creating a theory such as David Lewis' approach where each 'possible world'
really exists! Whilst I found it enjoyable and fascinating to consider Lewis' metaphysics, and admire his intellectual sturdiness, I just can't work with his conceptual scheme. To me, possibilities are not realities.I'm currently exploring further the notion of freedom implied by the phrase 'freedom is only necessity understood' - which seems to be a clear reference to Spinoza's approach and his argument that we need to free ourselves from the burden of hopes and fears... a burden that comes from the existential weight of feeling we
could have been anything other than what we are. No doubt I will write more about Spinoza in a future post - lately many of my thoughts have sent me in the direction of his
Ethics, so I have resolved to take a fresh look at his work.The view I want to defend is that
(a): determinism is true.
(b): we are 'free' in a certain sense.
I have already clarified (a), but would also like at this point to add Daniel Dennett's precise definition of the claim:
"All physical events are caused or determined by the sum total of all previous events."The second claim, that we are free, I have placed in inverted commas, to indicate that we are dealing with a word that has a controversial or subjective application. William James thought in his essay it would be best to avoid using the word 'freedom' at all, due to its having too many connotations and interpretations. Daniel Dennett prefers to continue to use the word, and argues that we should appropriate it to be used in a more helpful way, rather than leaving the word to the libertarians. He attempts to show the vacuousness of their usage of the word, and that in fact, their sense of 'freedom' raises more problems for morality and philosophy than determinism does.
I am a great admirer of Daniel Dennett's philosophical work in general, but in particular I was impressed by his arguments in
Elbow Room (1984). To summarize, he claims that we have all the varieties of 'free will' worth wanting, and that our resistance to determinism is due to its being portrayed in certain ways that engenders an irrational fear. Analogies are used such that we are made to feel as if we are puppets, or as if we are robots, or animals, for example. Dennett shows that although we
are animals, and although we
are mechanistic, like a robot, we have brains that are sufficiently more complex such that we can process information about our situation and about imagined consequences of our actions more effectively, giving us increased ability to navigate the natural world effectively. What kind of 'free will' is worth wanting? One in which we can follow our desires, not blindly, but using our minds. Well, our brains give us exactly this ability - in fact we cannot help but to will our actions using our minds!
A common objection is that this kind of determinism still doesn't satisfy our sense of moral responsibility. If, in the final analysis, one was
always going to do a certain action, one could not have avoided it, then how can they be held responsible? My answer would be that if the (most relevant) reasons that one could not have avoided the action can be located as part of that agent's character, then one is morally responsible, since blame can then be directly laid on the character of the agent. Certainly, I think we have to dispose of the notion of
ultimate moral accountability. No person invents himself in a vacuum, or
ex nihilo, so to speak. We have to 'settle' for a limited notion of responsibility that recognises that whilst ultimately one's
character is a product of one's brain and the environmental influences we undergo, nonetheless we are forced to take ownership of this
character - it doesn't belong to anyone else!
This philosophy may not suit those of certain right-wing political tendencies, who - for a variety of reasons... perhaps selfish ones - are inclined to minimize the influence of both nature and nurture. However, I am not inclined to see their disapproval as a particularly bad thing.
Another common objection is that such a mechanistic approach leads inexorably to fatalism or nihilism. To which, I would start by simply countering that it cannot be that inexorable, since I myself am a determinist - and yes, I am one who finds Nietzsche's work fascinating - but I am by no means a nihilist. I am, as you may or may not know, a 'pragmatic realist', in a sense inspired by Hilary Putnam (see
Metaphysics, Kim & Sosa, p.591ff). As such, I have a great regard for American pragmatism, such as that espoused by William James. However, I disagree with a number of his arguments in
The Dilemma of Determinism. I see no reason for pessimism to follow directly from determinism, though nor do I think optimism is implied either.
Things are what they are, and people are who they are, and yet they change how they change. For my part, I find it pragmatic to
act as if I am ultimately free, but only because it doesn't help to be constantly meditating on the sources and causes of our 'choices'. Furthermore, I don't think society 'needs' this idea of absolute responsibility, as some have argued. Once the the libertarians' 'straw man' arguments against determinism have been exposed as exaggerating our helplessness, we can find a moderate sense of responsibility that is much more realistic. Individually, we can but do our bit. We will continue to imagine different futures, and select those we most desire. It is the duty of the moral philosopher to identify the values, virtues and behaviours that will bring about the greatest good.
I wonder if those who argue for the absolutist notion of responsibility, have inherited this notion from religion, which seeks to personify all that is praiseworthy into one being. I love praise, don't get me wrong, but I am at peace with the notion that I can but claim limited credit for what I do...
This essay would not have been possible without ....[here I should list infinite factors, but will rather single out my metaphysics tutor at Manchester University, Helen Beebee]....................
